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Abstract
This paper develops and motivates a paraconsistent approach to semantic paradox from
within a modest inferentialist framework. I begin from the bilateralist theory developed
by Greg Restall, which uses constraints on assertions and denials to motivate a multiple-
conclusion sequent calculus for classical logic, and, via which, classical semantics can be
determined. I then use the addition of a transparent truth-predicate to motivate an in-
termediate speech-act. On this approach, a liar-like sentence should be “weakly asserted”,
involving a commitment to the sentence and its negation, without rejecting the sentence.
From this, I develop a proof-theory, which both determines a typical paraconsistent model
theory, and also gives us a nice way to understand classical recapture.
Introduction
This paper develops and motivates a paraconsistent approach to semantic paradox from within
a modest inferentialist framework. There are many different forms of inferentialism. By mod-
est inferentialism, I will mean a view on which a specified set of inference rules are taken to
determine the truth-conditional content of logical constants, and where those rules have a sub-
stantive connection with ordinary inferential practices (Belnap and Massey, 1990; Boghossian,
2003; Garson, 2010; Peacocke, 1986a,b, 1987). Much of the existing work on paraconsistent
logic emphasizes the construction of many-valued semantic consequence (Beall, 2013; Priest,
2006, 2008). By expanding upon the bilateralist theory of inferentialism, the aim is to develop
a paraconsistent proof-theory that itself determines the model theory.
In §1, I outline the bilateralist framework developed by Greg Restall (Restall, 2005, 2009),
which uses constraints on assertions and denials to motivate a multiple-conclusion sequent cal-
culus for classical logic. I also show how classical semantics can be determined by the calculus.
§2 introduces a transparent truth-predicate into the calculus, which, following advocates of
non-classical logic (e.g Parsons 1984; Priest 2006), is taken to motivate a non-primitive attitude
intermediate between assertion and denial. On this approach, a liar-like sentence should be
“weakly asserted”, involving a commitment to the sentence and its negation, without rejecting
the sentence. §4 outlines a corresponding model-theory (broadly this is Beall’s (2013) LP+),
before showing that any ordinary sequent calculus fails to completely determine that semantics.
To deal with this, in §5, I outline a 3-sided proof-theory, which both determines the semantics
LP+, and also gives us a nice way to understand classical recapture in limit cases. Whilst there
are a few novel technical results scattered throughout, the real novelty lies in the philosophical
setting for a generalized program of paraconsistent modest inferentialism.
http://abstracta.oa.hhu.de
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1 Modest inferentialism
This section briefly sketches the bilateralist approach to inferentialism. The modest version of
inferentialism that we are interested in here allows that the meanings of logical constants in
a language L are explained in terms of which inferences are valid in L . §1.1 introduces the
position and uses it to motivate a multiple-conclusion sequent calculus for classical logic. In
a way that will be specified in §1.2, these inferences can be said to determine classical model-
theory. Finally, in §1.3, the notion of absoluteness is introduced to characterize when a model-
theory is completely determined by a sequent calculi.
1.1 Motivating classical sequent calculus
Logic tells us something about the way that agents’ rational commitments are combined and
constrained over arguments. For example, an agent asserting α, β ` α ∧ β, may be said to be
rationally committed to not simultaneously asserting α, β and denying α∧β. Note that this way
of putting things is deliberately inequivalent to saying that the agent asserting α, β is thereby
rationally committed to asserting α∧β. This is because, whilst such rational commitments play
a key role in the fixation of beliefs, they neither commit an agent to logical omniscience, nor
do they rationally oblige an agent to assert α∧β where, for example α∧β is unreasonable given
the antecedent context of assertion. So, logic, on this view, constrains an agent’s commitments
by saying that it is rationally prohibitive to deny α ∧ β, given the assertion of α, β.
Importantly, this view takes logical consequence to tell us not just about assertion, but
about both assertion and denial, and the connection between the two. Restall’s (2005; 2009)
suggestion is to think of logical consequence as governing positions involving asserted and
denied statements.
Definition 1. (Position) A position [Γ : ∆] is a pair of sets of formulae where Γ is the set of
asserted formulas, and ∆ the set of denied formulas.
A position expressed in a language may be used to represent an agent’s rational commit-
ments in terms of the coherence between assertions and denials. Where [Γ : ∆] is a position,
we allow that [Γ, α : ∆, β] is the state adding the formula α to the left set Γ, and β to ∆.
Think of the above coherence constraints over rational commitment as saying that, a position
[Γ : ∆] is incoherent if it contains some formula in both the left set and the right set, so that
Γ ∩∆ 6= ∅. Thinking of this in terms of an agent, such a position indicates that some statement
is both asserted and denied, and so incoherent. Incoherence allows us to characterize sequent
provability.
Definition 2. (Sequent provability) If [α : β] is incoherent, then α ` β.
This follows because, if a position consisting of asserting α and denying β is incoherent,
then α ` β, and an agent who asserts α and denies β, as we said above, has made a mistake.
The definition generalizes in cases involving sets of assertions and denials. In a multiple-
conclusion (SET-SET) framework, Γ ` ∆ may be read in terms of the underlying atomic for-
mulae {α1, . . . ., αn} ` {β1, . . . ., βn}, which is (classically) equivalent to {α1 ∧ α2 . . . . ∧ αn} →
{β1 ∨ β2 . . . . ∨ βn}. Then, any position [Γ : ∆] for which an agent who asserts each member
of Γ, and denies each member of ∆ is incoherent. In that case, Γ ` ∆, and an agent is mistaken
to assert all α ∈ Γ and deny all β ∈ ∆.
Definition 3. (Sequent provability generalized) If [Γ : ∆] is incoherent, then Γ ` ∆.
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The general idea is to build-up a sequent calculus out of these constraints over assertions
and denials. First, consider the addition of structural constraints. Since both asserting and
denying the same formula is incoherent, from [Γ, α : ∆, α] and Definition 3, we have the usual
identity axiom for sequent-calculi.
α ` α for all α (Identity)
We also have weakening, since, if a position is incoherent, the addition of assertions or
denials will not bring it back to a coherent position. Contra-positively, if [Γ : ∆] is coherent,
and Γ′ ⊆ Γ and ∆′ ⊆ ∆, then [Γ′ : ∆′] will be coherent. This gives us:
Γ ` ∆ (Weakening)
Γ,Γ′ ` ∆,∆′
Think of extensibility constraints on assertions and denials. For a position [Γ : ∆] is
coherent, if the positions [Γ, α : ∆] or [Γ : ∆, α] are incoherent, then the original position
[Γ : ∆] must already be incoherent. In other words, if a position is coherent, it should be
extensible by a formula α to a coherent position where α is either asserted or α is denied. So,
where [Γ : ∆] is coherent, either [Γ, α : ∆] or [Γ : ∆, α] is coherent. This gives us:
Γ, α ` ∆ Γ ` α,∆ (Cut)
Γ ` ∆
Operational rules for the connectives can also be constructed fairly naturally out of po-
sitions. For example, if the position [Γ : ∆, α ∧ β] is coherent, then [Γ : ∆, α], [Γ : ∆, β], or
both, are coherent. Contra-positively, if [Γ : ∆, α] and [Γ : ∆, B] are incoherent, then so to is
[Γ : ∆, α ∧ β]. In this case, we know that Γ ` ∆, α, and Γ ` ∆, β, so that Γ ` ∆, α ∧ β. This
gives us:
Γ, α, β ` ∆ ∧-LΓ, α ∧ β ` ∆
Γ ` ∆, α Γ ` ∆, β ∧-RΓ ` ∆, α ∧ β
Keep in mind that, on this bilateralist approach, the meanings of connectives are built up
from the primitive speech acts of both assertion and denial, in contrast to the assumption that
denial of α is simply the assertion of ¬α. We construct the rules for classical negation by taking
a negation ¬α to be assertible when α is deniable, and vice-versa. So, if [Γ : ∆, α] is incoherent,
then so too is [Γ, α : ∆]. This gives us Gentzen’s classical negation rules:
Γ ` α,∆ (¬-L)
Γ,¬α ` ∆
Γ, α ` ∆ (¬-R)
Γ ` ¬α,∆
Analogous accounts can be provided for all of the classical sequent rules (Restall, 2005).
This gives us a construction of the classical sequent rules in multiple-conclusion form, which is
built out of a simple and plausible account of agents’ rational commitments.
1.2 A determination theory
Given that we are working toward a modest inferentialism, we can think of these rules as also
determining the truth-conditional content of the connectives. The general idea is to let the
assertion and denial conditions governing a logical connective determine a meaning for that
connective when the rules completely determine truth-conditional content. This view echoes
that suggested in Peacocke (1986b), with the general requirement that:
General requirement: The given rules of inference, together with an account
of how the contribution to truth-conditions made by a logical constant is
determined from those rules of inference, fixes the correct contribution to the
truth-conditions of sentences containing the constant (Peacocke, 1993, p.172).
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What follows draws heavily upon Hardegree (2005); Hjortland (2014); Humberstone (2011),
and the details developed in Trafford (2014). In providing a recipe for the interaction between
a sequent calculi and truth-conditions we should not talk of the truth-value of a sequent.
Nonetheless, we may understand a valuation as providing a counterexample, or not, to the
potential validity of a sequent in terms of whether or not truth is preserved when passing from
l.h.s formulae to right. The idea is to let incoherent positions, and therefore, provable sequents,
determine a set of valuations from the universe of possible valuations, U , over a languageL . In
this way, a logic induced by a proof-system can be said to determine a valuation-space V ⊆ U on
L , defined as any subset of the set of all possible valuations. First, define a logic as consisting of
all provable sequent inferences.
Definition 4. For a set of formulae S in a language L , a multiple-conclusion sequent is an
ordered pair, Γ, ∆, (where Γ ∪ ∆ ∈ WFF , and where Γ, ∆ are sets of formulae of S ). A
multiple-conclusion logic L is an ordered pair 〈S,L〉, where L is the set of binary relations `L
between finite subsets of S and finite subsets of S. A rule, R#, defined for a logic L consists of a
set of sequent premises and a set of sequent conclusions {SEQP } → {SEQC}. We call the set of
provable sequent in L, L-valid, such that Γ ` ∆ =df
{〈Γ,∆〉 is L-valid}.
Definition 5. V is a set of truth-values, and D ⊆ V designated values. A valuation v is a function
on L assigning a truth-value ∈ V to a formula in S where v : S → {V}. Classically, we have
V = {1, 0}, and D = {1}.
Before defining a relation between the two, first, note that (Definition 3) an incoherent
position [Γ : ∆] allows that Γ ` ∆, which we understood as saying that an agent is mistaken
to assert all α ∈ Γ and reject all β ∈ ∆. Equivalently, [Γ : ∆] is incoherent just in case some
α ∈ Γ is denied, or some β ∈ ∆ is asserted. This, and given that we read Γ ` ∆ as (classically)
equivalent to {α1 ∧ α2 . . . . ∧ αn} → {β1 ∨ β2 . . . . ∨ βn}, gives us that Γ ` ∆ is valid just in case
some α ∈ Γ is denied, or some β ∈ ∆ is asserted.
We use this to define a relationship between sequents and valuations in terms of satisfaction.
Definition 6. A sequent Γ ` ∆ is satisfied by a valuation v just in case v(α) = 0 for some α ∈ Γ,
or v(β) = 1 for some α ∈ ∆, otherwise v refutes the argument.
Because we have Cut, this is easily extensible to every formula in L .
Example 7. For a sequent Γ, α ` ∆ to be valid, we know that each v ∈ V has v(α) = 0 for
some α ∈ Γ ∪ α, or v(β) = 1 for some β ∈ ∆. Similarly, for Γ ` ∆, α to be valid, each v ∈ V
has v(α) = 0 for some α ∈ Γ, or v(β) = 1 for some β ∈ ∆ ∪ α.
Weakening plays the role of ensuring that each formula α ∈ S appears on either the l.h.s
or the r.h.s of a sequent. Cut ensures that no formula α ∈ S appears on both. Think of this
in terms of valuations. Then Identity tells us that all formulas α ∈ S takes either 1 or 0, and
Cut tells us that no formula takes both. In effect, cut allows for a partition of formulas into
those that take the value 1, and those that take 0.
Then, let L determine a valuation-space by determining the set of admissible valuations V
that are consistent with L.
Definition 8. (L-consistency) A valuation v ∈ U is L-consistent iff v satisfies each provable
sequent in L.
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Theorem 9. A logic L determines a valuation-space V which consists of the set of valuations that
are consistent with every provable sequent in L.
Proof. A valuation space V ⊆ U is determined by L when each v ∈ U is L-consistent, so
V(L) =df
{
v ∈ U : v is L-consistent}. Then V consists of the set of valuations that are consistent
with every provable sequent in L by definition.
1.3 Completeness
We are not quite home and dry here, since, whilst Theorem 9 may hold for a logic, it is possible
that a logic fails to determine a unique valuation space. In which case, we will not have achieved
a modest inferentialist account for that logic, since the meanings of the connectives will, to
some degree, be underdetermined. As is well known (Belnap and Massey, 1990; Carnap, 1943;
Dunn and Hardegree, 2001; Garson, 2010; Hardegree, 2005; Hjortland, 2014; Humberstone,
2011; Shoesmith and Smiley, 1978), single-conclusion formulations of classical logic fail in this
way.
We clarify this by noting that a valuation-space may also be defined semantically. On this
view, classically speaking, we expect VCPL to be induced by the truth-conditional interpretation
of each classical connective. Then VCPL contains those valuations v : S → {1, 0} that obey the
truth-conditional clauses for the connectives of classical propositional logic. We can then use
this valuation-space to determine a logic.
Definition 10. (V -validity) An sequent 〈Γ,∆〉 is V -valid iff, for all v ∈ V , v satisfies 〈Γ,∆〉.
Theorem 11. Starting from a valuation-space, V determines a logic L w.r.t V where all the V -valid
arguments are L-valid.
Proof. Let the set of all V -valid arguments constitute the logic L, which is now determined
by V : L(V ) =df
{〈Γ, α〉 ∈ L : 〈Γ, α〉 is V -valid}. All arguments valid on V are L(V )-valid by
definition.
So, it is possible to transition between a valuation-space and a logic, and vice-versa.1 This
allows us to define an abstract completeness theorem which, following Dunn and Hardegree
(2001), I call absoluteness.
Fact 12. (Hardegree, 2005) For any L, V ;
• L is absolute iff L = L(V(L))
• V is absolute iff V = V(L(V ))
When absoluteness holds, we have a guarantee that the determining relationship between
L, V is complete. We know (Theorem 11) that a semantic structure 〈S, V 〉 is determined by
an inferential structure 〈S,L〉 when the set of L-valid sequents are such that V comprises the
set of valuations consistent with each sequent in L. Absoluteness on V tells us that V ⊆ U is the
only valuation-space consistent with 〈S,L〉, and absoluteness on L tells us that L is the only set
of sequents that can be associated with 〈S, V 〉. So, absoluteness provides a standard by which to
analyze the determining relationship between an inferential structure and a semantic structure.
Theorem 13. (General determination theory) A semantic structure 〈S, V 〉 is completely determined
by an inferential structure 〈S,L〉 when L, V are absolute.
1Details can be found in appendix 1.
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We can utilize absoluteness to show that multiple-conclusion classical sequent logic com-
pletely determines the classical semantics.
Definition 14. (V -consistency) A valuation v is V -consistent when v satisfies every V -valid
argument (Hardegree, 2005).
Lemma 15. By the definition of absoluteness, V is absolute iff V contains every V -consistent val-
uation.
Proof. See appendix 1.
Theorem 16. For any V ⊆ U , V = V(L(V )) (in the SET-SET framework).
Proof. See appendix 1.
An immediate corollary is that the bilateralist framework gives us a modest inferentialist
account of classical logic where the valuation-space determined by the classical proof-theory
uniquely determines the valuation-space VCPL. Note that absoluteness does not hold for a
classical proof-theory in single-conclusion format, since the valuation-space determined by the
connectives ¬,∨ is compatible with valuations /∈ VCPL.2
2 Adding Transparent Truth
One of the motivating issues in the development of paraconsistent logics is the addition of a
truth predicate to classical logic. This section looks at a typical paraconsistent response that ex-
pands the set of truth-values. §2.1 shows what happens when we introduce a transparent truth-
predicate into the classical system; §2.2 outlines the model theory for a multiple-conclusion
paraconsistent semantics based on the logic LP+. §2.3 goes on to show that the system fails to
be absolute, which suggests that the bilateralist account can not provide an inferentialist home
for paraconsistent logics.
2.1 Transparent truth
Following Beall (2009), a transparent truth predicate is a notion of truth that is “see through”,
such that T (pαq) and α are intersubstitutable in all transparent contexts, and for all α ∈ S.3
Given Identity, this gives us familiar rules for T : T (pαq) ` α; and α ` T (pαq). In terms of
positions, we read this as saying for any incoherent position in which T (pαq) appears, α is also
incoherent. This gives us the following sequent rules:
Γ, α ` ∆ (T -L)
Γ, T (pαq) ` ∆
Γ ` α,∆ (T -R)
Γ ` T (pαq),∆
Taken alone, and given that we are working in SET-SET, both L¬, LT are absolute. Taken to-
gether, they result in typical paradoxes. Supposing self-reference to be available in the language,
we can construct a formula, Θ, of the form Θ : ¬T (pΘq). In the classical framework that we
are working in thus far, this quickly gets us into trouble:
2See appendix 1.
3Corner brackets indicate a name-forming device.
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T (pΘq) ` T (pΘq)
¬T (pΘq) ` ¬T (pΘq)
Θ ` Θ
T (pΘq) ` Θ
` ¬T (pΘq),Θ
` Θ
T (pΘq) ` T (pΘq)
¬T (pΘq) ` ¬T (pΘq)
Θ ` Θ
Θ ` T (pΘq)
Θ,¬T (pΘq) `
Θ `
`
The final step uses a single application of Cut, yielding the empty sequent, which is ex-
tensible to all S. So successive application of the rules allows us to infer any conclusion
from any premise. If we attempt to let L¬T determine a valuation space, it will be inco-
herent since the only v ∈ U that are consistent with it are vt =df {α ∈ S : v(α) = 1}, and
vf =df {α ∈ S : v(α) = 0}. In other words, the addition of T to LCPL entails that LCPL fails
to determine a coherent V , and so fails to determine the meanings of the connectives.
2.2 LP model theory
A typical paraconsistent response to the above employs a logic such as Graham Priest’s Logic
of Paradox (LP ), which allows for some sentences, such as Liar sentences to be “gluts”, that
is, both true and false. This has been extensively argued for in the literature (Priest, 2006). This
section outlines the basic model theory for LP . However, in keeping with the discussion above,
we will remain within a multiple-conclusion structure, and, following Beall (2013), denote this
LP+.
We extend Definition 5 to allow three truth-values so that V = {1, b, 0}, and D = {1, b}.
Again, we expect V to be induced by the truth-conditional interpretation of the standard
connectives. Then V contains those valuations v : S → {1, b, 0} that obey the truth-conditional
clauses for the connectives.
Definition 17. The connectives {∧,∨,¬} satisfy the truth-conditional clauses:
(i). Conjunction: v(α ∧ β) = min {v(α), v(β)}.
(ii). Disjunction: v(α ∨ β) = max {v(α), v(β)}.
(iii). Negation: v(¬α) = 1− v(α)
Let VLP be the valuation-space comprising the set of valuations induced for each α ∈ S.
Definition 18. A sequent, Γ ` ∆, is refuted by a valuation v iff, when v(α) ∈ D for each α ∈ Γ,
v(β) /∈ D for all β ∈ ∆); and otherwise satisfied by v.
Definition 19. A sequent is V -valid iff it is satisfied by each v ∈ V . Then;
• L(V ) =df
{〈Γ, α〉 : 〈Γ, α〉 is V -valid}.
Definition 20. For a set of formulae S in a language L , an LP+ sequent is an ordered pair,
Γ, ∆, (where Γ ∪ ∆ ⊆ S, and where Γ, ∆ are sets of formulae of S ). The logic LP+ is an
ordered pair 〈S,LP+〉, where LP+ is the set of binary relations `LP+ between finite subsets
of S and finite subsets of S. We call the set of provable sequent in LP+, LP+-valid, such that
Γ ` ∆ =df
{〈Γ,∆〉 is LP+-valid}.
We note some features of the logic LP+. The logical truths of LP+ are precisely those of
classical propositional logic.
Proposition 21. `LP+ α iff α is a classical tautology.
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Proof. lrd. Since all classical models are also LP+ models, this is clear. rld. Take a valuation of
LP+, vLP+ and a two-valued valuation vCPL which assigns 1 to α if v(α) ∈ D. We can prove by
induction that, if vCPL(α) = 1 then vLP+(α) ∈ {1, b}, and if vCPL(α) = 0 then vLP+(α) ∈ {b, 0}.
Hence, if vCPL(α) = 1, for each two-valued valuation vCPL then vCPL(α) is designated for each
three-valued vLP+ .
Proposition 22. LP+ is paraconsistent. Both (EFQ) and disjunctive syllogism (DS) are invalid in
LP+; i.e. α ∧ ¬α 0LP+ β; ¬α, α ∨ β 0LP+ β.
Proof. A counterexample to both is easily given when v(α) = b, and v(β) = 0.
2.3 Absoluteness for LP+
Given that we are working within a modest inferentialist framework, what we are interested
in is whether or not our position structures yield a proof-theory that adequately determines
LP+ models. In other words, what we require is that, starting from position structures, we
can build a logic that completely determines VLP+ as we have for bilateralist classical logic.
Without going into any details regarding such a proof-theory, it is simple to show that this is
not possible.
Theorem 23. For any logic L of the form SET-SET, and any V ⊆ U (for which V = {1, b, 0}),
V 6= V(L(V )).
Proof. See appendix 2.
The obvious issue is that we can no longer rely upon the partitioning of formulas into
those taking v = 1, v = 0. For LP+, it is possible to construct a kind of absoluteness proof,
but only by defining a partition over formulas into those that take designated values and those
that do not. That is, where, D = {α ∈ S : v(α) ∈ D} and D− = {α ∈ S : v(α) ∈ D−}, (where α ∈
D− =equiv α /∈ D). But, whilst partitioning into D, D− tells us something about consequence
relations for many-valued logics (which preserve D), it involves a loss of grasp on the semantical
clauses over VLP+ where we want to distinguish between designated values {1, b}.
What this means is that any logic that determines VLP+ will also be consistent with the
valuation-space VLP+ ∪ vb. So that logic, however we construct it, will underdetermine the
semantics of the connectives that it defines since it fails to determine a unique valuation-space.
It is not too much of a stretch to say that, working from a modest inferentialist account, we will
have failed to adequately determine the meanings of the connectives for any logic dealing with
truth-values beyond {1, 0}. In the next section, I suggest that the problem comes down to the
way in which formulas are located in the SET-SET framework. Then, by expanding bilateralist
positions to trilateralist positions, we may be able to expand the locations that formulas can
take in sequent arguments.
3 Expanding positions
This section provides motivation for the expansion of positions to trilateralist structures of the
form 〈Γ : Θ : ∆〉, where Γ indicates the set of asserted statements, ∆ the denied statements, and
Θ, a set of “weakly asserted” statements. A statement α is weakly asserted when asserting ¬α
does not rule out the content α (i.e. without also denying α). First, I clarify why LP+ fails
absoluteness by looking at the roles of Cut and Identity in determining the locations of for-
mulas over sequent arguments. This, together with a typical paraconsistent view of assertions
and denials motivates the addition of the third, intermediate, location within positions.
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3.1 Partitions and cut
We clarify why absoluteness fails for many-valued semantic structures by looking at the
roles played by Cut and Identity. First, recall that an ordinary SET-SET sequent α1, . . . , αn `
β1, . . . , βm is equivalent to {α1 ∧ α2 . . . ∧ αn} → {β1 ∨ β2 . . . ∨ βm}. This, by ordinary propo-
sitional logic, is equivalent to ¬α1 ∨ ¬α2 . . . ∨ ¬αn ∨ β1 ∨ β2 . . . ∨ βm.
Definition 24. Definition 18 is equivalent to saying that a valuation v satisfies a sequent Γ ` ∆
iff either one of the formulae in Γ is not designated or one of the formulas in ∆ is designated.
Spelling this out disjunctively over VLP+ , Γ ` ∆ is VLP+ -valid iff, for each v ∈ VLP+ , either
v(α) = 0, or v(α) = n for some α ∈ Γ, or v(β) = 1, or v(β) = b for some β ∈ ∆.
On this interpretation we can think of a sequents as having two locations, with the l.h.s of
the sequent being the undesignated location, and the r.h.s the designated location. So, Γ ` ∆
may be rewritten ΓD− ` ∆D.
Example 25. For a sequent Γ, α ` ∆ to be valid, we know that each v ∈ V has v(α) = 0 or
v(α) = n for some α ∈ Γ ∪ α, or v(β) = 1 or v(β) = b for some β ∈ ∆. Similarly, for Γ ` ∆, α to
be valid, each v ∈ V has v(α) = 0 or v(α) = n for some α ∈ Γ, or v(β) = 1 or v(β) = b for
some β ∈ ∆ ∪ α.
As this formulation makes clear, Identity plays the role of ensuring that each formula α ∈ S
appears on either the l.h.s or the r.h.s of a sequent, and Cut ensures that no formula appears on
both. Think of this in terms of valuations. Then Identity tells us that all formulas take a
designated value or a non-designated value, and Cut that no formula takes both. So, if, as in the
case of liar-like sentences, we end up in a position where a formula Θ is forced to be located
on both the l.h.s and the r.h.s of a sequent, Cut tells us that something has gone wrong. No
formula can be forced to be both designated and undesignated.
Inevitably, then, over ordinary sequent structures, formulae will be partitioned into those
that are designated, and those that are not, with no way of discriminating between, for example,
{1, b}. Whilst the system behaves nicely for two-valued cases, it is broken by the addition of
admissible values ∈ V. It is for this reason that absoluteness fails for ordinary sequent inferential
structures determining many-valued semantic structures. What we require then, is a way of
expanding the location of formulas such that the structural rules do not ride roughshod over
the finer-grained distinctions between truth-values. Then, we can expect Identity to ensure that
every formula α ∈ S takes some truth-value, and Cut to ensure that no formula takes more
than one.
3.2 Weak assertion
Once we have allowed that assertion is not the only game in town, the expansion of positions
to accommodate a third location is fairly well motivated. Think of liar-like sentences in terms
of rational commitment. The presence of liar-like sentences threatens to break down the
bilateralist account since Θ is not something that we can either assert or deny. In the above
presentation, Θ attempts to force an overlap between assertion and denial, which, because of
the role played by Cut, is impossible. Advocates of paraconsistent approaches usually take
assertion and denial to be exclusive states, so that denying α, in a sense, rules out the content
of α. Nonetheless, an agent can be inferentially committed to asserting certain contradictions
such that α,¬α 0. This is because asserting ¬α is not taken to be the the dual of denying α.4
Asserting ¬Θ will not, then have us also deny Θ. Rather, we should assert both Θ and ¬Θ. To
4For discussion, see Parsons (1984).
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follow this line of thought, Θ would then not force an overlap between assertion and denial,
but between assertion of Θ and ¬Θ.
On the paraconsistent response, denying α must, therefore, be stronger than asserting ¬α.
In this respect, we might think of this in terms of an additional speech act that is weaker
than assertion in that it does not cancel the content of the opposite proposition. As analogy,
whilst ordinary assertion and denial behave much like “exclusion negation”, weak assertion
will behave much like “choice negation” in a language.5 Think of this is in terms the grounds,
or evidence, that agents have for asserting or denying a proposition α.6 When an agent asserts
α, there should be grounds in the language (given a specific context) supporting α such that α
can not also be denied. But in paradoxical cases such as liar-like sentences Θ, there are grounds
in the language that provide support for ¬Θ, but not in such a way as to also support the denial
of Θ. An agent who is rationally committed to ¬Θ is not thereby committed to the denial of Θ.
In order for that to be the case, we would also require some sort of grounds for ruling out the
content Θ, but this is precisely what the liar-reasoning fails to provide. So, we have reason to
consider a third speech-act corresponding to cases of this kind.
Definition 26. (Weak assertion) A statement is weakly asserted when asserting ¬α does not
rule out the content α (i.e. without also denying α).
We should, of course, be wary of introducing ad hoc distinctions into a theory. But, in this
case, there are significant reasons for making these distinctions given that we are working in
a modest inferentialist framework. Even aside from the technical problems discussed above,
distinguishing between ordinary and weak assertion provides a way of understanding what an
agent becomes inferentially committed to in accepting some contradictions (α,¬α 0). Some
formulae, such as Θ can be weakly accepted.7
If this is plausible, then we have a trilateralist position structure [Γ : Θ : ∆], with Γ indicat-
ing the set of asserted statements, ∆ the denied statements, and Θ, the set of “weakly asserted”
statements. The relation between incoherent trilateralist positions and provable sequents will
be pretty much as above, except that we will have to allow for a third location in our sequent
structure, and the structural rules will need to account for this distinction.
4 Sequent calculi for trilateralist positions
This section develops a sequent calculus for LP+. We being from trilateralist positions, and
draw upon n-sided sequent calculi as developed in Baaz et al. (1993a,b, 1998), Hjortland (2013),
and Zach (1993) to construct a proof-theory which is absolute on VLP+ . The resulting proof-
theory has significant benefits in addition to the fact that it is suitable for the modest inferen-
tialist. Primarily, it offers an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions under which
certain classical valid, though paraconsistently invalid, arguments can be “recaptured”.
4.1 From trilateral positions to n-sequents
We rewrite the ordinary SET-SET sequent Γ0 ` Γ1 as a two-sided sequent Γ0|Γ1. Whilst the
indices indicate values, informally this should be read in terms of attitudes, indicating that
5See Tappenden (1999) for cases in which the use of “not” in a natural language context indicates the rejection of
an assertion without also indicating the assertion of the negation of the relevant sentence; e. g. “Some men are not
chauvinists. All of them are”, “John isn’t wily or crazy. He’s wily and crazy”.
6See, for example, Pagin (2012).
7Whether or not further distinctions amongst commitments may be warranted is left for further investigation. The
obvious further distinction would be the dual of weak assertion, weak rejection, which may be thought to correspond
roughly to a truth-value gap (see Remark 36).
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either something in Γ0 is rejected, or something in Γ1, accepted. Then, we simply carry over
from Definition 26:
Definition 27. Γ0|Γ1 is V -valid iff either v(α) = 0 for some α ∈ Γ0, or v(β) = 1 for some β ∈ Γ1.
The idea is to expand this strategy for three formula locations using n-sided sequents.
Definition 28. An n-sided sequent Γ is an ordered n-tuple of finite sequences Γ1| . . . |Γnwhere
Γn is the n-th component of Γ.
Where Γ is a sequent, Γi denotes the i-th component of the sequent, with the sequent
interpreted as a disjunction of statements saying that a particular formula takes a particular
location in the structure of the sequent. Then, it is straightforward to define a three-sided
sequent corresponding to the logic LP+.
Example 29. A three-sided sequent for LLP+ is written as:
Γ1|Γb|Γ0
again, read disjunctively as saying that either v(α) = 1 for some α ∈ Γ1, or v(θ) = b for some
θ ∈ Γb, or v(β) = 0 for some β ∈ Γ0.
The relation between incoherent trilateral positions and sequent provability can now be
characterized.
Definition 30. (Three-sided sequent provability) If [Γ : Θ : ∆] is incoherent, then Γ1|Γb|Γ0 is
valid.
We need to spell out incoherence disjunctively. A position [Γ : Θ : ∆] is incoherent if an
agent either denies or weakly asserts some α ∈ Γ, or asserts or denies some θ ∈ Θ, or asserts
or weakly asserts some β ∈ ∆. We use this to define the logic LP+.
Definition 31. A three-sided logic is an ordered pair 〈S,L〉, where L is a set of relations between
finite sets of three-sided sequents of S, and each sequent argument in L is called L-valid. For
the set of truth-values V = {1, b, 0}, and for each location Γi (which is a possibly empty set of
formulae ∈ S ), a valuation v satisfies a three-sided sequent iff for some Γi, when i ∈ {1, b, 0},
and some formula α ∈ Γi, v(α) = i.
Definition 32. An three-sided sequent is V -valid iff it is satisfied by each v ∈ V . A valuation
v ∈ U is L-consistent iff v satisfies each provable sequent in L.
• L(V ) =df
{〈Γ1|Γb|Γ0〉 ∈ L : 〈Γ1|Γb|Γ0〉 is V -valid}
• V(L) =df
{
v ∈ U : v is L-consistent}
By considering locations in trilateral positions pair-wise, we are able to ensure that the struc-
tural rules play the required roles, now formulated as follows (Baaz et al., 1993a).
α|α|α(Identity)
For each sequent location i:
Γ (Weakening)
Γ, [i : α]
For each couple of truth-values where vi 6= vj :
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Γ, [i : α] ∆, [j : α]
(Cut(i, j))
Γ,∆
Since the structure has more than two locations for formulae, Identity now makes sure
that each formula takes a valuation, and Cut operates on pairs of truth-values. So, Cut still
partitions formulae by ensuring that each formula takes a single truth-value only. For any
vi 6= vj for a formula A such that v(α) = vi = vj , α is removed:
Γ1| . . . |Γi, α| . . . |Γn ∆1| . . . |∆j , α| . . . |∆n
Γ1,∆1| . . . |Γn∆n
The difference is that for ordinary sequents, we had only two values to worry about, {1, 0}
(or two locations).
4.2 Proof-theory for LP+
We construct an 3-sided proof-system in a uniform way (Baaz et al., 1993a). The structural
rules remain as above and operational rules for each connective are given for each location in
the three-sided sequent as follows:
Γ0|Γb|Γ1, α Γ0|Γb|Γ1, β (∧1)
Γ0, |Γb|Γ1, α ∧ β
Γ0, α, β|Γb|Γ1 (∧0)
Γ0, α ∧ β|Γb|Γ1
Γ0, α|Γb, α|Γ1 Γ0, β|Γb, β|Γ1 Γ0|Γb, α, β|Γ1 (∧b)
Γ0, |Γb, α ∧ β|Γ1
Γ0, α|Γb|Γ1 Γ0, β|Γb|Γ1 (∨0)
Γ0, α ∨ β|Γb|Γ1
Γ0|Γb|Γ1α, β (∨1)
Γ0|Γb|Γ1, α ∨ β
Γ0, α|Γb, α|Γ1 Γ0, β|Γb, β|Γ1 Γ0|Γb, α, β|Γ1 (∨b)
Γ0|Γb, α ∨ β|Γ1
Γ0|Γb|Γ1, α (¬0)
Γ0,¬α|Γb|Γ1
Γ0, α|Γb|Γ1 (¬1)
Γ0|Γb|Γ1,¬α
Γ0|Γb, α|Γ1 (¬b)
Γ0|Γb,¬α|Γ1
The logic LLP+ comprises the set of valid sequent arguments determined by the
proof-system. For some V ⊆ U (where U has V = {1, b, 0}), VLLP+ = V(LLP+) ={
v : v is LLP+ -consistent
}
.
Soundness and completeness for V(LLP+) are relatively simple. First, soundness can be
proved, in the usual way, by induction over proofs, since the operational rules preserve validity
by definition, and the structural rules are valid. For completeness, if a sequent is VLP+ -valid,
then it is provable in the three-sided construction without cuts.8 The proof can be carried over
from Baaz et al. (1993b), which uses the method of reduction trees.9
Most importantly for our purposes, LLP+ is absolute w.r.t VLP+ as outlined semantically
in §2.2.
Theorem 33. In general, for a valuation space V ⊆ U , V = V(L(V )) (Hjortland, 2014).
Proof. See appendix 3.
8I note a complication regarding cut-elimination below.
9Priest (2008) uses the tableau system to give a completeness proof for FDE, which, though not constructed using
n-sequents, can be carried over with a little tweaking.
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As an immediate corollary, the 3-sided proof-theory for LP+ yields an absoluteness re-
sult. Then, we have a modest inferentialist account that, beginning with trilateralist positions,
provides a proof-theory that uniquely determines the valuation-space VLP+ .
4.3 Notable features of the proof-theory
4.3.1 Finer-grained distinctions
An immediate advantage of the 3-sided proof-theory (in addition to its inferentialist scruples),
is that it offers a way of maintaining fine-grained distinctions across sequent arguments. By
way of illustration, we can see that there is, despite absoluteness, no way of retaining these
distinctions in the ordinary sequent set-up.
Example 34. For LLP+(VLP+), typically, we will say that Γ ` ∆ is valid iff when v(α) ∈ D
for each α ∈ Γ, v(β) ∈ D for some β ∈ ∆, or equivalently, either v(α) /∈ D for some α ∈ Γ or
v(β) ∈ D for some β ∈ ∆. We can spell out the latter by saying that either v(α) 6= 1 and v(α) 6= b
for some α ∈ Γ or v(β) = 1 or v(β) = b for some β ∈ ∆. But, as we saw in §3.2, as long as
`LP+ obeys Cut (ensuring transitivity for the two-sided system), the differentiation amongst
D is lost. This is clearer when we consider that by the definitions of VLP+ and VLP+ -validity,
Γ `LP+ ∆ when Γ|Γ|∆ is VLP+ -valid. In other words, we can switch back from Γ0|Γb|Γ0 to
the two-sided Γ0 → Γb ∪ Γ1 where the latter is VLP+ -valid when v(α) /∈ D for some α ∈ Γ0
or v(β) ∈ D for some β ∈ Γb ∪ Γ1. But, there is no route back from a VLP+ -valid sequent in
this two-sided incarnation to a specific V -valid 3-sided sequent. In essence, this is due to the fact
that, whilst Cut holds for each of the three-locations in the three-sided structure, the three-sided
version of Cut does not guarantee transitivity in two-sided systems because of the way in which
the three-sided locations overlap in the two-sided structure.
This provides additional reason to think that pursuing issues related to paraconsistent logics
in three-sided constructions may be preferable to standard proof-theories (including those in
SET-SET) because of the fine-grained nature preserved by the logic.
4.3.2 Transparent truth
Take LLP , and additionally define operational rules for T :
Γ0, α|Γb|Γ1 (T0)
Γ0, T (pαq)|Γb|Γ1
Γ0|Γb, α|Γ1 (Tb)
Γ0|Γb, T (pαq)|Γ1
Γ0|Γb|Γ1, α (T1)
Γ0|Γb|Γ1, T (pαq)
Now, cut is no longer eliminable and the subformula property fails since T applies to
formulae of any complexity, including the liar sentence. It is not clear whether or not this
is problematic. For example, above, it was suggested both that T may be considered part of
the basic set of constraints on rational commitment, and it is required for absoluteness proofs.
As such, eliminating cut, whilst of technical interest, loses some philosophical motivation,
particularly given that any calculus involving T suffers from a loss of the subformula property
in any case.10
10It may be possible to rectify this by considering sequents in terms of multisets rather than sets, and develop a
construction without the structural rule of contraction.
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4.3.3 Classical recapture
As resultant from this finer-grained distinctions between formulas over sequent arguments, the
three-sided proof-theory also provides a nice way of understanding “classical recapture”. LP+
is notoriously weak in comparison with classical logic. As above, both EFQ and DS are invalid
in LP+. The failure of such inferences is counter-intuitive, and it threatens to undermine
significant features of ordinary reasoning. Resultantly, paraconsistent logics have come under
significant criticism (e. g. Parsons 1984; discussed in Priest 2006). By way of response, various
forms by which classical reasoning can be “recaptured” have been suggested (Priest, 2006, §8),
where:
Methodological maxim: Unless we have specific grounds for believing that
the crucial conditions in a piece of quasi-valid reasoning are gluts, we may
accept that reasoning. (116)
Whilst the maxim is certainly plausible, working out the logical details underlying it has proven
difficult. For example, we can not force consistency by somehow adding consistency to the
premise set. A natural thought would be to employ the truth-predicate, with a formulation
of the law of non-contradiction, such as ¬T (α ∧ ¬α) to “force” the consistency of truth. But,
¬T (α ∧ ¬α) does not logically rule out the possibility that T (α ∧ ¬α). A prominent suggestion
(Priest, 2006) has been to add a stronger than material conditional to the stock of logical
connectives, where, for all α, (α ∧ ¬α) →⊥. But, arguably, this is too strong as it requires
a logical connection between antecedent and consequent derived from relevant logic (Beall,
2012).
In any case, the three-sided proof-theory above has a significant advantage over these sugges-
tions in that it provides us with necessary and sufficient conditions for when certain classically
valid inferences are provable, and when they are not. For example, take the negation rules.
¬0 and ¬1 give the conditions for negation in LLP+ corresponding to assertion and denial. A
formula may be denied if its negation is asserted, and asserted if its negation is denied. This
corresponds to the classical rules ¬-L or ¬-R. The difference (and the reason why ¬-L and ¬-R
no longer force the equivalence of asserting ¬α with denying α) is that we also have the rule
¬b. This gives the conditions for negation corresponding to weak assertion. The negation
of a formula may be weakly asserted when the formula is weakly asserted. Taken together,
the rules impose constraints on V(LLP+) corresponding to the semantic definition of negation
(Definition 17).
Example 35. Take disjunctive syllogism (DS) as example. As we saw in Proposition 22, (DS)
is invalid in LP+. Let us analyze this in detail in the three-sided logic. First, consider the
disjunction rule ∨b (since ∨0 and ∨1 are familiar). The rule provides three (necessary and
sufficient) conditions under which a disjunction α ∨ β may be weakly asserted: α or β is
weakly asserted; and α is denied or weakly asserted; and β is denied or weakly asserted. As
before, we have a counterexample to (DS) where α is weakly asserted, and β denied. Since α is
weakly asserted, we know that ¬α is weakly asserted. Then, we can derive the provable sequent
argument Γ,¬α, α ∨ β ` α,¬α,∆:
Γ0|Γb, α ∨ β|Γ1 (∨b)
Γ0, β|Γb, α|Γ1 Γ0|Γb,¬α|Γ1 (¬b)
Γ0|Γb, α,¬α|Γ1
But, notice that we also have the resources in the proof-system providing the necessary and
sufficient conditions for when it is permissible to derive (DS). When, for example, α and β are
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asserted, we know (by the rule ∨1) that α ∨ β may be asserted. We also know (by ¬1) that
whenever α is asserted, ¬α may be denied. This allows us to derive (DS) (Γ,¬α, α ∨ β ` β,∆):
Γ0|Γb|Γ1, α ∨ β (∨1)
Γ0|Γb|Γ1, α, β
Γ0|Γb|Γ1,¬α (¬1)
Γ0, α|Γb|Γ1 (Cut)
Γ0|Γb|Γ1, β
Remark 36. It is not difficult to see that the 3-sided construction for LP is analogous to a
construction for the Kleene 3-valued logic, K3. K3 similarly has three algebraic truth-values,
with the middle value typically denoted i for indeterminate, so V = {1, i, 0}. In distinction with
LP , K3 has D = {1}. It is well known that K3 is paracomplete (law of excluded middle may
not hold), whereas LP is paraconsistent. So, the two logics have distinct consequence relations,
since, whilst they share the same interpretation of standard connectives, they differ with respect
to the interpretation of the truth-values. This fact is typically reflected in standard proof-
theoretic constructions of the two logics.11 However, in an n-sequent construction, the two
coincide apart from the decoration of the middle sequent. Nonetheless, whilst the decoration
is arbitrary, it reflects a distinction between the two structures at the level of provability.12 By
the translation in Example 34, we say that Γ `LP ∆, whenever Γ|∆|∆ is derivable in LLP ; in
distinction, Γ `K3 ∆, whenever Γ|Γ|∆ is derivable in LK3 , where LK3 is equivalent to LLP
( just decorate the middle sequent with i in place of b). This difference allows us to distinguish
between the two structures, so that, for example, law of excluded middle is derivable in LLP ,
but not in LK3 . Additionally, we know, by Theorem 33, that the semantics for LK3 , V(LK3),
will be absolute, and, since the designated values differ from that of V(LLP ), the consequence
relation differs accordingly.
We can make sense of this approach to LK3 by considering the dual to weak assertion,
“weak denial”, where a statement α is weakly denied when denying ¬α does not rule in the
content α (i.e. without also asserting α). This is typical in discussions of paracomplete logics.
Of course, if we allow weak denial alongside weak assertion, then it is possible to construct
a four-sided sequent structure by simply expanding sequents to: Γ1|Γb|Γi|Γ0. Unsurprisingly,
the semantic structure determined by the full (four-sided) sequent structure is precisely that of
first degree entailment (FDE ), and, again, by Theorem 34, their relationship is absolute.
Conclusion
This paper has developed a modest inferentialist approach to paradox. Starting with a bilat-
eralist framework, an account of absoluteness for multiple-conclusion classical logic was pro-
vided. This, however, does not carry over to many-valued logics such as LP+, primarily due
to structural deficiencies in both bilateral positions and ordinary sequent formulas. By way of
response, I suggested expanding bilateralism to trilateralism, which incorporates a third, inter-
mediate, speech-act, “weak assertion”. In doing so, we can construct, out of trilateral positions,
a proof-theory using three-sided sequents. This proof-theory for LP+ is absolute, and also
provides a simple way of understanding classical recapture.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
The below follows the account given in Trafford (2014).
Thinking of L and V(L) in the abstract (as not yet constrained by any proof-system), we
have, in effect, two partially ordered sets defined over L (Hardegree, 2005):
(P1) The set of all valuation-spaces V ⊆ U on L , ordered by set-inclusion;
(P2) The set of all logics L ⊆ L′ on L , ordered by set-inclusion.
The relation between the two induces an antitone Galois connection between valuation spaces
and logics (Dunn and Hardegree, 2001; Hardegree, 2005; Hjortland, 2014; Humberstone, 2011),
where a generalized Galois connection is an adjunction of maps between partially ordered sets
in terms of order preservation functions.
Definition. A Galois connection between posets P , Q is a map: f1 : P → Q and f2 : Q → P
where the following conditions hold for all subsets Pn, Qn of P , Q:
P0 ⊆ f2(f1(P0)) (4.1)
Q0 ⊆ f1(f2(Q0)) (4.2)
P0 ⊆ P1 ⇒ f1(P1) ⊆ f1(P0) (4.3)
T0 ⊆ T1 ⇒ f2(T1) ⊆ f2(T0) (4.4)
It follows that f1 ⊆ f1f2f1 ⊆ f1, so f1 = f1f2f1 and also f2 = f2f1f2.
For our purposes, here P is the set of all valuations over L , and Q the set of all sequents in
L, with satisfaction being the relation defining the functions between them. For any valuation
space V , f1(V ) consists of the set of sequents satisfied by each v ∈ V , i.e. f1(V ) = L(V ).
For any logic L, f2(L) will consist of the set of valuations that satisfy every sequent in L, i.e.
f2(L) = V(L).
With this, we can define a closure operator cl as a function on the posets 〈V,L〉, given that cl
obeys the following clauses for all x, y on 〈V,L〉:
(c1) x ≤ cl(x)
(c2) cl(cl(x)) ≤ cl(x)
(c3) x ≤ y → cl(x) ≤ cl(y)
This ensures that, where cl is a closure operator on a poset 〈P,≤〉, and x is an element of P ,
then x is closed iff cl(x) = x. In our context, this gives us an abstract completeness theorem
over 〈V,L〉.
Fact. For each V ⊆ U and L ⊆ L′ (for some S ):
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L ⊆ L(V(L)) (4.5)
V ⊆ V(L(V )) (4.6)
L ⊆ L′ ⇒ V(L′) ⊆ V(L) (4.7)
V ⊆ U ⇒ L(U) ⊆ L(V ) (4.8)
Proof. Given at length in Hardegree (2005).
With this, we define absoluteness.
Fact. (Hardegree, 2005) For any L, V ;
• L is absolute iff L = L(V(L))
• V is absolute iff V = V(L(V )).
Proof. By the fact that L, V form a Galois map, and the definition of Galois closure (c1–3).
Resultantly, we can give general soundness and completeness theorems for the construction
of any normal, finite logic.
Fact. Let Γ be any set of formulas in S. Define vΓ, as: vΓ(α) = 1 if Γ ` α, and vΓ(α) = 0 otherwise.
Then vΓ is L-consistent and vΓ ∈ V(L).
Proof. (Hardegree, 2005) If not, there must be a sequent, ∆ ` β in L that is refuted by vΓ, so
that vΓ(∆) = 1 and vΓ(β) = 0. Given the way in which vΓ is defined, this means that Γ ` ∆. But,
∆ ` β is L-valid, and given that the ` associated with L is closed under transitivity, it follows
that Γ ` β, so by the definition of vΓ, vΓ(β) = 1, so vΓ does not refute Γ ` β.
Fact. In general, for any finite normal logic L, L = L(V(L)).
Proof. (Hardegree, 2005) Suppose that some 〈Γ ` β〉 /∈ L, to show that 〈Γ ` β〉 /∈ L(V(L))
(in other words, it is refuted by V(L). Take the valuation vΓ, which by Lemma 17 is in V(L).
By definition, vΓ satisfies all derivable sequents of L. Since L is reflexive, each element of Γ is
derivable in L, so vΓ satisfies Γ. But, since 〈Γ ` β〉 is not L-valid, β /∈ Γ, so vΓ refutes β. Then vΓ
refutes 〈Γ ` β〉, and so too does V(L), thus 〈Γ ` β〉 /∈ L(V(L)).
Theorem. For any V ⊆ U , V = V(L(V )).
Proof. (Dunn and Hardegree, 2001, p. 200) We prove contra-positively by defining a valuation
v0 /∈ V (in order to show that v0 /∈ V(L(V ))). Then define T = {α ∈ S : v0(α) = 1} and
F = {α ∈ S : v0(α) = 0}. For any v ∈ V , v 6= v0, so either v(α) = 0 for some α ∈ T or
v(α) = 1 for some α ∈ F . Then v satisfies T ` F , and it follows that T ` F is valid on V . But, by
definition, v0 refutes T ` F , so v0 /∈ V(L(V )).
Example. Absoluteness does not hold for VCPL because the classical proof-system defining the
connectives ¬,∨ is compatible with valuations /∈ VCPL. For example, say we define negation
in this framework as:
Γ, A ` B ∧ ¬B (Reductio)
Γ ` ¬A
Γ ` A Γ ` ¬A (EFQ)
Γ ` B
>From this, induce L¬, and determine a corresponding valuation space V¬. Then V¬ 6=
VCPL if the latter is supposed accord with the truth-functional definition f¬:
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f¬(x) =
{
1 if x = 0
0 if x = 1
More precisely, V 6= V(L(VCPL¬)) because, whilst L¬ is sound and complete w.r.t VCPL, it is
also sound and complete w.r.t alternative semantic structures. For example, Hardegree (2005)
defines a super-valuation associated with a valuation-space V to be the valuation vV where, for
every WFF , α, vV (α) = 1 if v(α) = 1 for every v ∈ V and vV (α) = 0 otherwise. Clearly, L¬
is sound and complete w.r.t both VCPL, and VCPL ∪ vV .
Appendix 2
Theorem. For any logic L of the form SET-SET, and any V ⊆ U (for which V = {1, b, 0}), V 6=
V(L(V )).
Proof. We show that this is the case by showing that the absoluteness proof when V = {1, 0}
(Theorem 16) is inadequate when we add intermediate truth-values. First, we define a valuation
vb /∈ VLP+ (in order to show that vb ∈ V(L(VLP+))). Let vb be defined such that, for every
α ∈ S, vb(α) = b (clearly, vb /∈ VLP+ since vb makes everything a glut at once). Since vb /∈ VLP+ ,
for each v ∈ VLP+ , there is some formula α for which v(α) 6= vb(α). For such a formula,
let Γ = {α ∈ S : v(α) /∈ D} and ∆ = {α ∈ S : v(α) ∈ D}. Keep in mind that vb(Γ) = b, and
vb(∆) = b. Where L = L(VLP+), Γ ` ∆, since either α ∈ Γ, and so v(α) /∈ D, or α ∈ ∆, and so
v(α) ∈ D. However, unlike the case where V = {1, 0}, vb also satisfies Γ ` ∆, so we can not
use that partition to rid ourselves of inadmissible valuations.
Appendix 3
Theorem. In general, for a valuation space V ⊆ U , V = V(L(V )) (Hjortland, 2014).
Proof. We proceed by supposing that v0 /∈ V , with the intent to show that v0 /∈ V(L(V )).
First, define Γ1 = {A ∈WFF : v0(A) 6= v1}; Γ2 = {A ∈WFF : v0(A) 6= v2}; . . . ; Γn =
{A ∈WFF : v0(A) 6= vn}. As is clear, for each v 6= v0, v satisfies the sequent Γ1|Γ2| . . . |Γn,
since v 6= v0, there is a formula A where v(A) 6= v0(A). If we assume that v0(A) = vi, then, for
some j 6= i, v(A) = vj . By definition, A ∈ Γk for each Γk where k 6= i, so A ∈ Γj . Hence v
satisfies Γ1|Γ2| . . . |Γn. However, v0 fails to satisfy Γ1|Γ2| . . . |Γn, since if it did, then for some
i there is a formula A ∈ Γi such that v0(A) = vi. But, by definition, if A ∈ Γi, then v0(A) = vi.
Hence, Γ1|Γ2| . . . |Γn is V -valid since it is satisfied by each v 6= v0, and, because it fails to be
satisfied by v0, v0 /∈ V(L(V )).
